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FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING 
US AND HOW TO RESTORE IT, by Colin Mayer1
PROFESSIONALS AND ACADEMICS ALIKE often view the corporation as a 
significant building block of the modern world. However, the financial crisis 
of 2008 swiftly exposed flaws in the conceptual nature of the corporation and 
failures in its governance and ownership structures. In recent years, these issues 
have thrust themselves to the forefront of business and legal scholarship and have 
markedly impacted corporate regulatory schemes.2
Colin Mayer, former Dean of Oxford University’s Saïd Business School and 
co-founder of European economics consultancy Oxera, is one of many sharp critics 
of the modern corporation and the current market and regulatory frameworks 
that surround it. Mayer’s Firm Commitment combines theory with pragmatic 
commercial application in a wide-ranging critique of the commercial corporation. 
Mayer’s analysis is a unique fusion of anthropology, economics, law, philosophy, 
politics, and sociology, making it accessible to any class of reader. Throughout 
the book, Mayer promotes and expounds a theme of “commitment”—the notion 
that the corporation should be viewed as, and should act as, a mechanism for 
providing commitments to its various stakeholders. Mayer skillfully advances this 
theme in each chapter of the book in order to prime the reader for a striking and 
novel blueprint for change.
The book is neatly arranged into three sections: part one outlines the failings 
of the modern corporation from a regulatory, reputational, and social perspective; 
part two describes why such failings are so pervasive today; and part three offers 
targeted measures to achieve Mayer’s vision of commitment. In part one, before 
1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 320 pages.
2. See e.g. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111-203, 
124 Stat 1376 (2010) (a sweeping corporate regulatory framework signed into US law in 
mid-2010).
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launching a determined and well-researched assault on the modern corporation, 
Mayer celebrates its merits—that of prosperity, employment, savings, and 
consumption. He then presents an impassioned analysis of the corporation’s 
“avaricious”3 objectives and examines its detrimental impact on wealth, social 
cohesion, and the environment. In particular, Mayer discusses the realities 
of dispersed ownership and how it leads to the dangerous and oft-exploited 
separation between ownership and control. He then concludes part one by 
identifying common fallacies ingrained in reputational and regulatory checks on 
corporate behaviour, such as hostile takeovers and shareholder activism.
In part two, Mayer targets the deleterious consequences of corporate 
governance and shareholder ownership. Mayer begins this section by tracing the 
evolution of the Anglo-American phenomenon of dispersed corporate ownership. 
He examines how this model is conducive to abuse at the hands of those with 
short-term market objectives (or what Mayer terms “short-termism”4). Mayer 
then introduces the concept of “representation without commitment”5 and uses 
the infamous Kraft-Cadbury takeover to highlight the potential conflicts that 
markets for corporate control often create with non-shareholder stakeholders. 
He then details a story of two distinct twentieth-century European lending 
institutions in order to highlight the merits of financial commitment and the 
pursuit of “long-term preservation of capital value.”6 Mayer then harnesses these 
narratives into powerful critiques of the financial systems of the UK and the 
United States.
In part three, Mayer discusses his theory of corporations as a “commitment 
mechanism” as opposed to a “control device.”7 In doing so, he moves away from 
conventional economic theory and exposes the reader to a normatively charged 
vision of corporate success. Finally, Mayer introduces novel solutions to the 
core issue identified throughout the book—the corporation’s failure to build 
“long-termism” into its fabric. Mayer helpfully uses modern success stories (for 
example, Germany’s ThyssenKrupp and India’s Tata Group) to demonstrate what 
long-term commitment means in practice. Mayer then advances three concrete, 
non-regulatory solutions to be adopted voluntarily by progressive corporate 
leaders. These measures are unique, well-justified, and intend to alleviate the 
3. Supra note 1 at 1.
4. Ibid at 211-12, 252.
5. Ibid at 209. This term is coined by Mayer and, by inference, refers to the prevailing attitude 
of many short-term investors who are not genuinely “committed” to the long-term prosperity 
of the corporation but may be able to exact control over it by way of voting control.
6. Ibid at 227.
7. Ibid at 151.
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commitment problems ingrained in today’s corporate governance and ownership 
structures. Mayer bolsters these proposals by providing comprehensive technical 
detail in an attached appendix.
Although Canada’s model of shareholder primacy8 is less rigid than that of the 
United States, the critiques in this book should resonate with Canadian business 
leaders, policymakers, and shareholders. In this multi-layered commentary on 
the modern corporation, Mayer demonstrates that ownership commitment issues 
are intensifying due to current market and regulatory mechanisms—a troubling 
reality for any business-focused reader.
8. That is, the notion that directors of a corporation, in fulfilling their responsibility for the 
management of the business and affairs of the corporation are obliged to act with a view 
to the “best interests of the corporation” (which encompasses the interests of shareholders 
as a whole, among other constituencies and stakeholder groups). See Canada Business 
Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 122(1)(a). See also BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 
2008 SCC 69.

